Abstract

The legal system remains a central object of philosophical study, even as changes in our understanding of its nature, boundaries, and internal workings render it increasingly challenging to theorize. Few have seen this as clearly as the late Oxford philosopher, Joseph Raz, has. Well-known for his pathbreaking work in moral and political philosophy – including on freedom and authority from a liberal outlook – Raz made important contributions to our understanding of the law, analyzing the legal system as a nexus mediating reasons between political authorities, officials, and subjects. In this chapter, I want to reflect on Raz’s legal thought in three areas: his criterion for the identity of legal systems; his theory of legal validity; and his account of the unity of legal systems. I hope to show how the apparently distinct subjects are in fact intimately connected given Raz’s fundamental commitments – to the social underpinnings of law, its systematic nature, and its function in guiding action – and to exemplify their relevance to the modern study of the law.