Ceci n'est pas un Conte: Amedeo G. Conte and the Philosophy of Legal Acts
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Abstract
The present study is aimed at deepening Amedeo G. Conte's studies by highlighting three relevant aspects related to the philosophy of legal acts. The first, and philosophically most challenging, of these aspects has to do with the constitutivity of legal acts. The second, centered on conditions of validity, highlights the need to develop a theory stating that the positive regulation of legal acts, though artificial, always repeats or presumes some speech acts of ordinary language, already endowed with intrinsic normativity. The third aspect focuses on the idea of an eidetic-constitutive rule so as to criticize the use of this concept in the theory of legal acts.
Keywords
- Amedeo G. Conte
- Speech Acts Theory
- Legal Acts
- Performative Utterances
- Social Ontology