Abstract

The current process of the financial sector rulemaking, firstly designed pursuant to the «Lamfalussy Report» followed by «de Larosière Study Group report», is almost entirely entrusted to European political institutions and authorities in the application of the principles of better regulation. Few areas of competence remain in the hands of national legislators and regulators: areas of lesser harmonisation where prudential issues are of little importance, or where the protection of the saver/investor has no impact on the creation of an internal single market for financial sector services or where conduct of business rules and service provision issues are of exclusive national relevance. The purpose of this paper is (A) to critically analyse the financial sector rulemaking process with the aim of highlighting – with regard to the four areas covered by the paper (rulemaking process democratic control and subsequent judicial control; participation in such process; sharing of standards; rules enforcement) – any critical issues; (B) to verify the impact severity of any critical issues found in the areas described above, in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of the process of creating rules and (C) to propose solutions that, coordinated with each other, may allow to minimise any critical issues found