Abstract

The ever-increasing programming and production of driveless cars for social security purposes has, in fact, created a space for discussion on whether an AI-powered car can possess morality. It would be a third-person and impersonal morality, since no artificial entity is endowed with consciousness and self-awareness. Yet, the case of "moral machines" or "artificial moral agents" is the subject of strong discussion in the ethical-anthropological field. What is the role of philosophical ethics? What is the ontological proprium of a subject endowed with moral responsibility? This article is articulated around these questions which, on the one hand, intends to present some elements at the basis of the philosophy of information born in the context of the fourth revolution; while on the other hand we try to discuss and argue what are the limits of an artificial agent and the impossibility that it connotes itself as a personal, responsive and responsible individual, moral subject of his own action.