Abstract

The article is motivated from a paper by Enrico Berti about the position of Aristotle in the thought of Emanuele Severino and the multiple issues raised by him in his critical confrontation with the Stagirite philosopher, among which is the question about the “contingentµ or “necessaryµ character of being. The author, therefore, examines a number of Aristotelian texts on the themes of “possibilityµ and “contingencyµ that are discussed analytically by Severino within his major works and regarding which a number of problematic issues are highlighted. In particular, Severino argues that the contingency of being is not a phenomenological given; that its affirmation contains, in any case, a contradiction; and that in the Aristotelian concept of power as the “power of contrariesµ the contradictory nature of being is implicitly affirmed. From the Severinian investigation as a whole, the thesis emerges that in the Aristotelian concept of “possibleµ and those directly connected to it, including that of “free will,µ a “nihilisticµ conception of being is contained. On the other hand, the conclusions of the article note that although in Severino’s thought on the plane of ontology “possibilityµ is radically excluded, nevertheless a positive reference to the latter remains as to the plane of knowledge for the “finite consciousnessµ of being