Abstract

The analysis of the efficiencies resulting from a merger in order to approve the deal, even if in presence of some negative effects with regards to competition, is a subject of great interest because of its remarkable practical implications on the activities of the competition authorities. As to EU Commission, new Regulation 139/2004 (together with its guidelines and notices package) has explicitly provided for the possibility to assert an efficiency defence: however, the discipline still lacks of clarity on this point and sounds like a compromise. The essay summarises the main features of the new regulation, also according to some previous important cases dealt by the Commission: attention is paid to some elements of uncertainty that have to be clarified through practical enforcement. On the basis of this analysis, the essay also try to develop some reflections on the scope and the effects of antitrust enforcement related to merger control: in particular, it is underlined that, as a consequence of the main features of a market economy that limits State intervention, efficiency analysis must be carefully accorded with welfare considerations.