Abstract

Theories of constitutional pluralism have used the same conceptual root upon which pluralistic democracies have developed. However, the system level at which these theories work is different: if the concept of pluralism arises within the State framework, theories of constitutional pluralism are mainly aimed at inter-legislative relations, in particular in the context of the EU. The essay takes a critical look of five main features of this theories: 1) the incommensurability of the claims originating at different system levels (member States and EU); 2) the exclusion of any hierarchical logic in the configuration of relations between the EU and the Member States; 3) the lack of a unique, permanent structural or procedural solution in case of conflict between the different constitutional sites; 4) a concept of sovereignty that is completely open or "undecided; 5) finally, the substantial acceptance of the democratic deficit that characterises the EU. The author thinks that the road opened by constitutional pluralism should not be abandoned, but only perfected and made coherent.