Abstract

Starting from the analysis of the growing complexity of the regional financial audit – as an effect, among other things, of the constitutionalisation of the balanced budget rule and of the audit functions of the Court of Auditors – now articulated on several levels, the essay reconstructs its dual «soul» – on one hand, the control over the reliability of the financial information, on the other hand, the «report» to Regional Councils – and then focuses on the controversial nature of the financial audit. Also in the light of the most recent constitutional case law (in particular decision no. 184/2022), the analysis demonstrates the jurisdictional nature of this kind of control, because it is based on the strict application of regulatory parameters; it is informed by the adversarial principle; it is characterised by a binary structure and a dichotomous outcome having an indirect effect on regional autonomy; it provides the opportunity to raise the question of the constitutionality of a law. In the last part the paper focuses on the relevant implications on the political and legislative autonomy of the Regions