Abstract

In the Jena period, the relationship between reflective and speculative philosophy takes centre stage in Hegel’s work on epistemology. Hegel’s production in Jena envisages the welding together of knowing and acting, of theory and praxis, into a new theory of subjectivity. My claim in this essay is that, emerging from a comparison with transcendental philosophy, an original theory of intuition can be found at work in the Differenzschrift (1801). Unlike Fichte and Schelling, Hegel develops a notion of intuition, not as the peak of knowledge, but as endowed of an organic connection with the concept of reflection. In this essay, I will review the difference between «reflection in isolation» and «reflection as Reason» and the meaning of transcendental intuition (§ 1). I will then focus on the relationship between reflective and speculative knowledge (§ 2). Finally, I will highlight some aporetic aspects of this relationship, but also the way out that Hegel identifies in his attempt to develop a concrete theory of the subject (§ 3).