Emanuele Arielli

Sharing as Speech Act

Are you already subscribed?
Login to check whether this content is already included on your personal or institutional subscription.

Abstract

Social media platforms allow users to perform different speech acts: status updates could be assertives, a like is an expressive, a friendship request is a directive, and so on. But sharing (or "retweeting") seems to lack a fixed illocutive status: this explains why present controversies concerning the sharing of misinformation have been debated in legal procedure and discussed from the point of view of personal responsibility without reaching a general consensus. The premise of this paper is that the diffusion of false or unwarranted information could be better analyzed if we consider sharing a precisely definable speech act. I will describe some dominant interpretations of the act of sharing that are not, however, sufficient to fully explain it. As an alternative, it will be shown that there is a specific illocutive structure of the act of sharing, which not only consists in asserting the "shareworthiness" or the relevance of a content, but is primarily comparable to an "attention-orienting" directive.

Keywords

  • Speech Act Theory
  • Social Media
  • Attention
  • Misinformation
  • Defamation
  • Sharing

Preview

Article first page

What do you think about the recent suggestion?

Trova nel catalogo di Worldcat