Erwin Tegtmeier

Epistemological realism and correspondence in Brentano

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Abstract

Brentano is to be credited with overcoming representationalism originating mainly from Descartes. He arrived at direct realism while giving up the correspondence theory of truth which is wrongly equated with epistemological realism. Crucial is Brentano's intentional relation specific to mental acts and relating directly to objects. Moreover, his view that mental acts have objects but no content is also relevant because it excludes that the content can play the role of representative of the object. Brentano not only dropped the correspondence theory of truth, he throws out truth altogether and substitutes it with evidence. This is in line with direct realism which focusses on the object.

Keywords

  • Brentano
  • Evidenz
  • Intentional relation
  • Meinong
  • Realism
  • Representationalism

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