Venanzio Raspa

The adventures of content through Bolzano, Twardowski and Meinong

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Abstract

Distinguishing between mental act and content of representations and propositions in themselves, Bolzano offers a logico-semantical notion of content. Twardowski opposes to it a psychological conception of the content of representations and identifies the content of the judgment, in the case of existential judgments, with the existence of the object, in the case of judgments about a relation, with the subsistence of the relation. In opposition to Twardowski, Meinong does not confound logical and psychological content and shows, by means of the notion of presentation, that a content is present in all experiences, including emotions.

Keywords

  • Bolzano
  • Content
  • Emotions
  • Judgment
  • Meinong
  • Twardowski

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